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INTRODUCTION

According to Judge Friendly, "there seems to be a kind of spontaneous generation about the federal constitution; the more questions about it
are answered, the more there are to be answered." ' The same is true
about administrative law. Indeed, our administrative law is notable not
only because of its importance, but also because of its rapidly changing
character. In 1943, the Supreme Court referred to a particular area of
administrative regulation as one "the dominant characteristic of which
was the rapid pace of its unfolding." 2 The same statement could be made
about the entire field of administrative law. The paramount characteristic of the administrative law that has developed since the turn of the
century has been what we may term its Heraclitean nature: the subject is
t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.S.,
L.L.B., LL.D., LL.M., Ph.D., Doc. d'Universite.
1. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can'tandLegislators ho Won't,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 788 (1963).
2. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
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one that has been in a continual state of flux. To one working in administrative law, it may truly be said, "The World's a Scene of Changes, and
'3
to be Constant, in [such a field] were Inconstancy."
II.

CRUCIAL ISSUES A HALF CENTURY AGO

The extent of change in administrative law can be demonstrated by
considering the different issues that have been crucial in the field over the
years. We can start our discussion by going back to March 1940, when
Dean James M. Landis delivered a noted public lecture on "Crucial Issues in Administrative Law." 4 In it, he dealt with what he considered
the principal problems in the administrative-law field, and more particularly, with those posed by the highly controversial Walter-Logan bill,
then pending before Congress. Though it has been a half a century since
the Landis lecture was published, in terms of the development of administrative law it seems much longer ago than that. The controversy
aroused by the Walter-Logan bill was part of the era of extremism in
administrative law fostered by the then recent New Deal expansion of
agency authority and the almost fanatic efforts of those who resisted the
new governmental devices. More recently we have come to see that
neither the thrill of the New Dealers nor the chill of their opponents'
adequately reflected the reality of the administrative process. The irrational hopes and fears of the 1930's have given way to more reasoned
attempts to restrain administrative excesses while, at the same time, recognizing and desiring to retain the essentially good features of administration. Such attempts have sought largely to canalize the exercise of
agency authority within proper procedural bounds and culminated, as is
well known, in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.6
What were the crucial issues noted by Landis fifty years ago, and to
what extent have they been resolved since that time? The Landis lecture
emphasized two primary problems: (1) whether the federal agencies
should be subject to a general administrative-procedure statute,7 and (2)
the proper scope of judicial review.'
3.

Abraham Cowley, Inconstancy, in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS IN VERSE AND PROSE OF

ABRAHAM COWLEY 106 (Rev. Alexander B. Grosart ed., 1967).
4. James M. Landis, CrucialIssues in Administrative Law, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1077 (1940).
5. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process. A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 110, 1107 (1954).
6. ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
7. Landis, supra note 4, at 108.
8. Id. at 109.
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The first of these questions has, of course, been answered affirmatively by passage of the APA. With that law, the controversy aroused by
the question of whether uniform standards of fair administrative procedure should be formulated in statutory form has all but ended. When
Congress enacted the APA in 1946, with what Justice Frankfurter
termed unquestioning unanimity, 9 the first issue posed by Dean Landis
was resolved. Since that time, the basic principles behind the act have
gained well-nigh universal acceptance, even from those who had formerly opposed such legislation.
The second crucial issue addressed by Landis, the scope of judicial
review, has not, to be sure, been resolved in the same manner as the
question of whether there should be an administrative-procedure statute.
Yet it cannot be denied that, on this issue too, the situation has changed
drastically in the last half century. At that time, the issue of the proper
scope of review was one of the most hotly contested questions in our
administrative law. Today, as Professor Davis has pointed out, the controversy has become mostly a matter of history: "The long debate about
de novo review versus restricted review is about ended; the Ben Avon and
Crowell cases10 are of little interest except as history; extremists have
moved from both ends toward the middle; and the substantial-evidence
rule now dominates nearly all judicial review of administrative action in
the federal courts.""
As a result of the tendency to assimilate review of administrative
agencies to appellate review in the judicial process itself, the substantialevidence rule, which governs judicial review of administrative agencies,
has become analogous to the "clearly erroneous" rule that governs appeals under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 "A finding is 'clearly
erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."' 3 The same can also be said of the
substantial-evidence test, as interpreted in the now celebrated Universal
Camera case. 4 Can a finding be other than "clearly erroneous" when
the reviewing court, in light of the entire record, cannot conscientiously
find that the evidence supporting that finding is substantial? 5 On the
9. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
10. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ohio
U.S. 287 (1920).
11. Davis, Administrative Law 868-69 (1951).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
13. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
14. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
15. Id. at 48.
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333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
474 (1951).

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 4, Art. 9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28:793

other hand, if the court determines that a challenged finding is supported
by evidence deemed substantial, even after considering the body of evidence opposed to the finding, 16 how can the court be "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"?
III.

CRUCIAL AREAS A QUARTER CENTURY LATER

In 1966, a quarter century after the Landis lecture, I attempted to
update his discussion by writing about the crucial areas in administrative
law at that time. 7 I noted two crucial questions that had come to the
fore. The first question concerned administrative powers of search and
seizure and inspection, which had become prominent by then-recent
Supreme Court decisions. The second question concerned the legal status of individuals receiving governmental largess. In the area of administrative searches and seizures, the Abel case confirmed administrative
arrest power.1 8 I stressed the need for safeguards over such an anomalous administrative power, but the law has remained much as it was laid
down in Abel. Fortunately, the administrative arrest power has remained
confined to immigration law. The fear I expressed that the Abel reasoning might be applied to agencies other than the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has therefore proven groundless.
A. Administrative Inspection Power.
My discussion of administrative inspection power was more important, as a practical matter, because it applies generally to agencies. In
Frank v. Maryland,19 the Court held that an administrative inspection
was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.20 Hence, the power
of agencies to inspect without a warrant existed as an adjunct to administrative regulation of both dwellings and business premises. 2 My article
stressed the dangers posed by unrestricted administrative inspection
power. Unfortunately, at that time, the law seemed settled on the matter
by the Frank decision.
In the past quarter century, however, the Court overruled Frank
and laid down the rules governing agency inspection power. Camara v.
16. Id.
17. Bernard Schwartz, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 401
(1966).
18. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). Compare Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. - (1993)
(arrest and detention of alien juveniles).
19. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at 366-67.
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Municipal Court22 and See v. Seattle2 3 held that, despite Frank, administrative inspections were subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.2 4 These rules were summarized in the 1987 Burger case25
involving administrative inspection of an automobile junkyard. Later
cases, however, developed an exception for "closely regulated" businesses.26 "Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a
'closely regulated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the
warrant and probable-cause requirements . . . have lessened application."2 7 In the case of such a business, including the Burger junkyard, a
warrantless inspection is valid if it meets three criteria: 1) "there must be
a 'substantial' governmental interest [in the] regulatory scheme;" 2) "the
warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory
scheme;" and 3) the inspection program, through the certainty and regularity of its application, "must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. ' 28 Thus, when a regulatory scheme satisfies these
three criteria, it is valid notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment's general warrant requirement. This resolution of the administrative inspection issue appears satisfactory. Private property is protected by the
constitutional guaranty, but its requirements are more flexible where
closely regulated businesses are concerned because rigid insistence upon
the warrant requirement could make effective regulation virtually
impossible.
B. Privileges Versus Rights.
The most important crucial issue discussed in my 1966 article was
that of the legal position of the individual dependent upon government
largess. At the time, such an individual was not protected by the requirements of administrative procedure that had been developed by the courts
and the APA. The prevailing rule was that no person had any "right" to
the largess dispensed by government. On the contrary, such largess was,
under the law, considered a mere "privilege" provided by the state. As
such, it could be withheld, granted, or revoked arbitrarily by the donor,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
1991).
27.
28.

387 U.S. 523 (1967).
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 534; See 387 U.S. at 541.
New York V. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
For a summary, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.5, 119-20 (3rd ed.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
Id. at 702-03.
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regardless of its nature-be it a job,2 9 a pension,3 ° welfare aid,3 ' veterans'
disability benefits,3 2 a government contract, 33 or any other benefit to
which the individual had no preexisting "right." Consequently, an everlarger area of administrative power was insulated from the safeguards of
due process. Further, the individual dependent upon public largess was
placed in a legal status subordinate to that of others in the community.
Under the prevailing law, such "privileges" could be withheld or revoked
without adherence to the procedural safeguards that would otherwise be
required by the Due Process Clause before administrative action adversely affecting a particular person could be taken.3 4
My article sharply criticized the law on this matter and urged the
repudiation of the right-privilege distinction as the criterion upon which
administrative procedure depended. 35 Four years later that call was
heeded in Goldberg v. Kelly.36 Goldberg does not rank with the
landmarks of Supreme-Court jurisprudence, and it remains largely unknown except to specialists. Yet, in its own field, it ranks as a leading
case which Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion, has said was "the
opening shot in [the] modem 'due process revolution' "31 that has transformed our administrative law.3 8
As more recently summarized by Justice Brennan, Goldberg held
that, under due process, "a hearing was required before a welfare recipient's benefits could be terminated. ' 39 In his opinion, Brennan enunciated a rationale rejecting the privilege concept that had previously barred
welfare recipients from procedural protection. Brennan stated that the
recipient's claim could not be answered by the argument that "public
assistance benefits are 'a privilege' and not a 'right.' ""4 The opinion
characterized welfare benefits as a "matter of statutory entitlement" and
29. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per
curiam) (4-4 decision); McAuliffe. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

30. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934).
31. See Wilkie v. O'Connor, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
32. See Slocumb v. Gray, 179 F.2d 31, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
33. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at § 5.12.
34. See e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896
(1961).
35. See also Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
36. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progressof the Law," 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 3, 19 (1988).
38. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at § 5.16.
39. Brennan, supra note 37, at 19.
40. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. Brennan later noted that the Court had "finally rejected the
wooden distinction between 'right' and 'privileges.'" Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 71 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/9

6

Schwartz: Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law
SOME CRUCIAL ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
799

1993]

added in a note that it "may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' "41 Therefore, Goldberg
introduced the concept of "entitlement" 42 which is fully protected by
procedural due process.
IV.

CRUCIAL ISSUES TODAY

The crucial issues in administrative law today illustrate the previously quoted Friendly truism:4 3 the more administrative-law questions
that are resolved, the more they give rise to others still to be answered.
Two crucial administrative-law issues today flow directly from the two
issues previously discussed. First, does extension of procedural protection to what were considered only "privileges" before Goldberg mean
that administrative action now must be preceded by the full evidentiary
hearings traditionally required by due process? Second, should the substantial-evidence rule be extended to cover all aspects of the scope of
review?
A.

Cost-Benefit and Procedure.

The Goldberg v. Kelly "revolution" extended due-process procedural
requirements to almost all "privilege" cases that had previously been beyond the procedural pale. This extension is particularly true of those
cases involving government largess such as the welfare decision in
Goldberg itself.' The problem is that in these newer areas of administrative procedure, the traditional due-process approach requiring full evidentiary hearings in all cases may do more harm than good. However
fair in theory may be the procedure modeled upon the courtroom, fully
judicialized procedure may frustrate effective administration in a field
such as welfare. Undue judicialization in this area may frustrate effective
administration in the interest of those intended as the law's beneficiaries
not only because of the nature of the cases involved, but also because of
their number. When we move from regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission-type agencies to those administering social welfare programs, we move into mass administrative justice, where
cases are measured not in the thousands but in the millions.
Fully judicialized procedure may be ill adapted to the needs of mass
administrative justice. What is needed, as the Supreme Court has stated
41.
42.
43.
44.

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
Id.
Friendly, supra note 1, at.
Id. at 254.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 4, Art. 9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28:793

in Richardson v. Perales, is procedure that not only is fair, but that also
works.4 5 Procedure that is unduly cumbersome will only serve to frustrate effective administration. In the Court's words in Goss v. Lopez,
"[t]o impose in each... case even truncated trial-type procedures might
well overwhelm administrative facilities.... Moreover, further formalizing the.., process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may
not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy
its effectiveness." 6 Somehow a procedure must be found that can cope
with a great volume of cases and that is suited to the relatively small
sums of money involved in most of them. In a great many cases the sum
at stake may be less than the cost of the record alone. At the same time
it must be remembered that the few dollars in issue on a claim may be
vitally important to the individual who is completely dependent on the
government grant. Somehow a middle ground must be found.
The Court attempted to find such a middle ground in Mathews v.
Eldridge.47 The Court ruled that due process did not require a
preterminati in hearing before disability payments were ended.48 The
opinion enunciated a three-prong test to determine whether due process
has been satisfied.4 9 As summarized in more recent cases, the test requires balancing of "the nature of the private interest, the efficacy of additional procedures, and governmental interests," 50 particularly "the
costs that additional procedures would involve."5 1
The Mathews test is essentially a cost-benefit test52 which "requires
a comparison of the costs and benefits of giving the plaintiff a more elaborate procedure than he actually received."5 3 The procedure should be
required if its costs are less than the benefits likely to be produced.
Under this approach, due process requirements should depend upon a
balancing of the competing interests at stake,54 with emphasis upon the
costs and benefits involved in each additional procedure required. In
cases with the most serious consequences, such as welfare termination, "a
fairly extensive evidentiary hearing may be constitutionally required.""5
In other cases, due process may demand less. The law should chose less
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 349.
Id. at 335.
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975, 995 (1990).
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980).
Propert v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 961, 962 (D.D.C. 1990).
Parrett v. Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1984).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).
Brock v. Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252, 261 (1987).
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burdensome alternatives where the benefits from the more burdensome
procedure would be outweighed by the marginal costs of time and expense.5 6 In other words, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, "we have
emphasized that the marginal gains from affording an additional procedural safeguard often may be outweighed by the societal cost of providing such a safeguard.""7
It is, however, one thing to use a cost-benefit approach on the question of how judicialized a hearing is required by due process. It is quite
another thing to use a cost benefit approach to determine whether any
hearing at all is required by due process. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has begun applying the Mathews v. Eldridgetest in the latter manner. In Connecticut v. Doehr 58 a state statute authorized a judge to allow
the prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing
upon the plaintiff's verification that there was probable cause to sustain
the validity of his claim.5 9 The Court ruled that the statute did not satisfy the due process requirements' under the Mathews test.6 1 All the
Justices agreed that it failed that test because: (1) the interests affected
were significant; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation that the state permitted was substantial; 62 and (3) the interests in favor of an ex parte
attachment were too minimal to justify the burdening of Doehr's ownership rights without a hearing to determine the likelihood of recovery.63
As indicated, Doehr used the Mathews test to determine whether a
hearing was required by due process. This application, however, is a misuse of the test. Mathews "established a cost-benefit test for determining
whether the Due Process Clause requires a particular type of notice and
hearing." ' Once it is determined that there is a due process right to be
heard, Mathews tells us what process is due, or in other words, the specific procedures that should be required. The Mathews balancing test
should not be used to permit summary agency action. The Due Process
Clause has already tilted the balance in favor of some procedure; Mathews only tells us the degree of formality that is demanded in the given
case.
The courts have nevertheless continued to misuse the cost-benefit
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 263.
Walters v. National Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320-321 (1985).
111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991).
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 2112-13.
Id. at 2115.
Propert v. District of Columbia, 741 F. Supp. 961, 962 (D.D.C. 1990).
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approach to determine whether a due process right to be heard exists in
the given case. The courts have also used cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
determine whether other procedural rights exist in a given case. The
leading case is Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza6 where the Court used CBA to hold that the exclusionary rule is
not a due process requirement in an administrative hearing.66 LopezMendoza arose out of a deportation proceeding where the alien objected
to the introduction of evidence at a deportation hearing. The alien contended that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was the
fruit of an unlawful arrest.6 7 In holding that the evidence was validly
introduced, the Court followed a CBA approach that weighed the benefits secured from the exclusionary rule in a deportation case against the
costs of applying the rule in such a case.68
Justice O'Connor, who wrote the Lopez-Mendoza opinion, found the
benefit of the exclusionary rule to be significantly reduced in a deportation case.69 Justice O'Connor noted several factors that significantly reduce the likely deterrence value of the rule.70 First, deportation is still

possible when there is other sufficient evidence not related to the arrest,
and, second, every INS agent knows it is highly unlikely that a particular
arrestee will challenge the proceedings.71 Justice O'Connor added that
"[t]he deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings is undermined by the availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that might violate Fourth Amendment
rights."72 On the other hand, Justice O'Connor said that an application
of the exclusionary rule "would require the courts to close their eyes to
ongoing violations of the [immigration] law."7 3
Under the Lopez-Mendoza decision, it is not enough to ask whether
a right guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated in the given
case. An affirmative answer is not enough to lead to a decision in favor
of the individual. Instead, CBA must be applied to determine whether
the right itself is guaranteed in the particular proceeding. If the CBA
balance tilts against the right in the given case, the government action
will be upheld even though it has violated the right concerned.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1043-44.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/9

10

1993]

Schwartz: Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law

SOME CRUCIAL ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

803

Both federal and state courts have followed Lopez-Mendoza.74
Whether its CBA approach should be applied generally to procedural
rights is one of the current crucial issues for our administrative law and,
indeed, for our public law as a whole.7 5 Using CBA as a due-process
lodestar could lead to serious dangers. CBA has a delusive aura of scientific objectivity that may be justified in the field of economics. As a public-law tool, however, it is as subjective as the Benthamite "felicific
calculus" 76 that was its primitive progenitor. Just as each utilitarian
would apply the "greatest happiness of the greatest number"" principle
according to his own subjective judgment of the pains and pleasures involved, so each judge employing CBA will use his own individual
calculus in weighing the procedural rights at issue.
CBA in the law reduces our basic rights to the level of the counting
house. It "invites members of the Bar to dust off their calculators and
dress their arguments in quantitative clothing. The resulting spectacle
will perhaps be entertaining." 7 8 However, when CBA becomes the mea-

suring rod for the protection of constitutional rights, the inevitable result
is their dilution. When we deal with a constitutional right such as that
protected by the exclusionary rule, it is much easier to quantify costs
than it is benefits. It is all but impossible to measure most constitutional
rights in monetary terms. It is not difficult, however, to measure the
costs of protecting those constitutional rights in given cases. How much
is freedom from illegally seized evidence worth?
In cases such as Lopez-Mendoza, it is much easier to measure the
costs than the benefits. Since a constitutional right cannot really be
quantified in monetary terms, the cost-benefit approach will always tend
toward a heavier weighing of the cost side of the scale. The result in a
Lopez-Mendoza-type case is that the law is "drawn into a curious world
where the 'costs' of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the 'benefits' of such exclusion are made to
disappear with a mere wave of the hand."79 A system that values basic
rights in more than dollars-and-cents terms should hesitate before following an approach under which priceless may too often mean worthless.
74. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at § 7.12.
75. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
76. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrI-rANICA 486 (1969 ed).
77. JEREMY BENTHAM, 10 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 142 (John Bowring ed. 1962).
78. American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products, 780 F.2d 589, 610 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Swygert, J., dissenting).
79. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B.

Chevron Doctrine.

Legal rules, unlike those in the physical sciences, do not have fixed
areas of strains and stress. Instead, legal rules are too often pushed to the
breaking point permitted by expediency. A crucial issue for administrative law today is whether the Chevron doctrine,"° which Justice Scalia has
proclaimed the most important administrative law doctrine in recent
years," will be pushed to the breaking point.
Chevron itself was a direct result of the resolution of the scope-ofreview issue noted by Dean Landis half a century ago. As previously
discussed, the predominance of the substantial-evidence rule in judicial
review of administrative action resolved the issue of the scope of review.
The Universal Camera case 2 interpreted the substantial-evidence rule as
a test of the rationality of agency findings of fact. Thus, courts may de83
termine the reasonablenessnot the rightness of such findings.
The scope of review in administrative law is based upon the law-fact
distinction, with application of the substantial-evidence rule limited to
agency findings of fact. The distinction between "law" and "fact" is,
however, by no means clear-cut. It is not always easy to detect the line
between legal and factual issues in an administrative proceeding. 4 For
example, is an administrative finding that involves statutory interpretation one of law or one of fact for purposes of scope of review? That
question, as Judge Friendly points out, is an old one.8 5 Traditionally, the
answer was that it was a question of law. Chevron, on the other hand,
answers that it is to be treated like a finding of fact.
The Chevron opinion begins with the hornbook principle that interpretation of a federal statute depends upon Congressional intent: "If the
intent of Congress is clear that is the end of the matter."8 6 The court
applies this principle when it reviews an agency's construction of a statute as in other cases involving statutory interpretation. What happens,
however, when Congress has not indicated any intent on the matter?
The lower court, in Chevron, had held that when Congress does not
express its intent, the reviewing court might impose its own construction,
80. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 512.
82. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
83. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at § 10.8.
84. Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1961).
86. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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just as it would do in the absence of any administrative interpretation.87
The Supreme Court reversed. 8 If a court determines that Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, it may not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be the case in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. "Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."8 9 In other words, the principle of deference is fully

applicable where Congress did not have any intent on the precise question at issue. In Chevron, once the court of appeals determined that Congress "did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the
bubble concept [at issue], 90 the question before it was not whether in its
view the concept was 'inappropriate,' but whether the Administrator's
view that it is appropriate . .. was a reasonable one."9'

Because the

agency's use of the concept was a reasonable policy choice, its choice had
to be upheld upon review.92 As more recently explained by Justice
Scalia, Chevron holds "that courts must give effect to a reasonable agency
interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a
clearly expressed congressional intent." 93 Therefore, the "courts should
determine whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is permissible,
94
not correct."
The agency in Chevron was engaged in rulemaking. Hence, Chevron
stated a principle that governs review of administrative regulations. The
cases since Chevron, however, indicate that Chevron cannot be limited to
review of regulations alone. Instead, the Chevron doctrine applies to review of all statutory interpretation by agencies whether in rules or adjudicatory decisions. 95 For example, in NationalFuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),96 Judge Bork stated

that, "in Chevron, the delegation of power to the agency was implicit
.... By contrast, the delegation of adjudicative authority to an agency
87. Id. at 841-42.
88. Id. at 842.
89. Id. at 843.
90. The EPA regulations allowed all the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping to be treated as though they were encased within a single "bubble." Id. at 837.
91. Id. at 845.
92. Id.
93. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987).
94. Scalia, supra note 81, at 512 n.7.
95. See National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563 (D.D. Cir. 1987) (holding
that courts must defer to an agency's reading of a settlement agreement even where the issue involves
proper construction of language).
96. 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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that is empowered to hear disputes, receive settlement proposals, and
enter binding orders is explicit - it closely resembles a direct congressional authorization to implement the provisions of a statute through
regulations., 97 The conclusion is that "this explicit delegation of power
to an agency compels a court to give deference to the agency's conclusions even on 'pure' questions of law within that domain." 9
Judge Bork supports his view that Chevron applies to review of
"'pure' questions of law" by the assertion that it was really such a question that was involved in Chevron itself. "Chevron considered the proper
standard for judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation, and
the construction of a statute has always been considered a 'pure' question
of law." 99 In this respect, Bork's view is supported by Justice Scalia, who
said in his concurring opinion in Immigration and NaturalizationService
v. Cardoza-Fonsecathat, "in Chevron the Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's abstract interpretation of the phrase 'stationary source.' ,100 Scalia's statement was called forth by the implication
of the majority's opinion in Cardoza-Fonsecathat Chevron deference does
not apply to "a pure question of statutory construction" which is "for the
courts to decide." 10
' 1 More recently, however, the Court confirmed that
Chevron did apply to "a pure question of statutory construction, [where
the agency must be] accorded.., deference... as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute."'0 2 This confirmation
means that Chevron deference must be applied to "a pure question of
statutory construction," as well as to "the application of a 'standar[d] ...

to a particular set of facts.'
C.

",103

Chevron and Jurisdiction.

The extension of Chevron to all interpretations, both in rules and
adjudicatory decisions, and even to those involving "pure" questions of
law, upsets the balance in our administrative law. It blurs the distinction
between law and fact upon which the scope of review is grounded. It
drastically limits review, not only of "agency findings of 'fact' in the narrow, literal sense,"'" but also of agency constructions of statutory law.
97. Id. at 1569.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 1569-70.
100. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 455 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 446.
102. NLRB v. United Food Workers & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112,
123 (1987).
103. Id. at 134 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. SEC v. Central Ill. See. Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 126 (1949).
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The latter, under the traditional theory of Anglo-American judicial review, are matters more legal than factual in nature, and hence, are open
for determination by the courts upon review. One can even say, as Professor Sunstein recently has, that "the notion that administrators may
interpret statutes they administer is inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles." 0 5 The "basic principle" in our system is that
"[i]nstitutions limited by a legal restriction are not to be permitted to
determine the nature of the limitation, or to decide on its scope. The
relation of the Constitution to Congress parallels the relation of regulatory statutes to agencies. In both contexts, an independent arbiter should
determine the nature of the limitation."' 1 6
The Chevron doctrine presents the danger of undue deference to selfexpansion of an agency's jurisdiction. This is particularly true when an
agency's power to act may be dependent on findings involving statutory
interpretation. If the agency misapplies the statute upon which its power
rests, it may be acting beyond its jurisdiction. For example, if a workers'
compensation agency is vested with authority to make awards to injured
"employees," then the agency's very power to act depends upon its finding that the given claimant is an "employee."' ' 0 7 The same is true if the
agency makes a finding that the injury "arose out of and in the course of
employment," or a finding that there had been an "injury" at all, or any
finding that makes the statutory scheme apply to the given fact
08
pattern. 1
The courts have already legitimized agency action that would otherwise be ultra vires as shown in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America." 9
At issue was a Department of Labor Hazard Communications Standard,
which imposed disclosure requirements on employers aimed at ensuring
that their employees were informed of the potential hazards posed by
chemicals in the workplace."0 The Department submitted the Standard
to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval before it collected the information. OMB disapproved three of the Standard's provisions on the ground that their requirements were not necessary to protect
employees. The Department withdrew those provisions."' Respondents
challenged OMB's disapproval. They argued that Chevron should not
105. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 143 (1990).
106. SUNSTEIN, supra note 105, at 143.
107. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (concerning a workers' compensation claim
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act).
108. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 26, at § 10.28.
109. I10 S.Ct. 929 (1990).
110. Id. at 931-32.
111. Id. at 934-35.
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apply in this case because OMB's regulations determined the scope of its
jurisdiction under the Act. The Court opinion did not deal with this
argument, but Justice White stated in his dissent that the Court had
never accepted it and "there are good reasons not to accept it."1' 12 According to White, under Chevron and its progeny, cases "have deferred to
agencies' determinations of matters that affect their own statutory jurisdiction.... The application of Chevron principles cannot be avoided on
'1 13
this basis."
Justice Scalia has also applied Chevron deference "to an agency's
interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction."' 14 According to Scalia, such an application "is both necessary and appropriate. It
is necessary because there is no discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of
its authority. To exceed authorized application is to exceed authority.... Virtually any administrative action can be characterized as either
the one or the other, depending upon how generally one wishes to describe the 'authority.' ",115 This argument, however, is a two-edged
sword. Under Chevron deference, if agencies are permitted to exceed
their authority, it militates against Chevron itself in a system that had its
16
origin in the jurisdictional basis of judicial review.'
Justice Scalia further stated that "deference is appropriatebecause it
is consistent with the general rationale for deference: Congress would
naturally expect that the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its statutory authority or jurisdiction." 11 7
It is questionable, however, whether Congress had the intention stated by
Scalia. Statutory provisions confining an agency's authority manifest an
unwillingness to give the agency freedom to define the scope of its own
power. As Professor Sunstein tells us, a "cardinal" administrative law
principle, "is that those who are limited by law should not be empowered
to decide on the meaning of the limitation: foxes should not guard
henhouses. The Chevron rule disregards this principle by permitting
agencies to interpret laws that limit and control their authority.""' 8 To
give effect to the confining intent behind statutory limitations, the ultimate word on jurisdiction should be with the courts, not the agencies.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 943-44.
Id. at 944.

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988).
Id.
See Wade, Administrative Law 41 (6th ed. 1988).
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 381-82.
118. SUNSTEIN, supra note 105, at 224.
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Chevron Ad Absurdum?

The most controversial decision of the Supreme Court's 1990 Term,
Rust v. Sullivan, 119 illustrates how Chevron may skew the result in what
would have once been a simple administrative-law case. At issue in Rust
were Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations
which prohibited federally-funded Title X projects from engaging in activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. 120 Doctors
challenging the regulations argued that this provision did not authorize
the Secretary to interfere with their First-Amendment right to counsel
their patients by prohibiting them from giving information and advice
12
about abortion. 1
The controversy over Rust concerns the Court's holding that the
regulations did not violate plaintiffs' First-Amendment rights. It was the
Court's application of Chevron, however, that was the foundation of the
Rust decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist first declared the statutory language to be "ambiguous" and therefore, under Chevron, "substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing statute by the
agency authorized with administering it.' 1 2 2 As a result, "[t]he Secretary's construction of Title X may not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the
statute and does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent."' 123 Here, because the Secretary's construction falls under this test,
"we must defer to the Secretary's permissible construction of the
24
statute." 1
Several points should be noted about the Rust application of Chevron. Rehnquist's opinion states that Chevron deference requires the
agency's interpretation to be upheld "if it reflects aplausible construction
of... the statute."' 125 Until Rust, it had been assumed that "the Chevron
yardstick [was one of] 'reasonableness.' "126 As previously quoted, Justice Scalia stated that Chevron requires the courts to "give effect to a
119. 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
120. Id. at 1764-65.
121. Id. at 1766.
122. Id. at 1767.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1769.
125. Id. at 1767 (emphasis added).
126. Continental Air Lines v. Dept. of Transportation, 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See also, National Assn. for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing the "reasonableness" standard enunciated in Chevron).
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reasonable agency interpretation of a statute." '2 7 Rust, however, transforms the reasonableness requirement to one of plausibility. The plausibility requirement may be met by an interpretation that has only an
appearance or show of the truth,12 or in other words, a statutory interpretation that is only superficially fair or reasonable. 129 In this respect,
Rust further dilutes the scope of review even beyond the dilution under
Chevron itself.
Rust also changes the Chevron approach to cases involving inconsistent agency interpretations. In Rust, petitioners argued that the agency's
interpretation "is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp
break with prior interpretations of the statute in question." 130 The Court
declined to accept the argument stating that it had been rejected by Chevron itself. 3 1 Chevron, however, only said that inconsistent agency interpretations, "[do] not ... lead [the Court] to conclude that no deference
should be accorded to the agency's interpretation of the statute."'132 The
Court did not state that full Chevron deference should be accorded. Both
logic and law indicate that the scope of review should be stricter in such
a case. Where the administrative experts themselves are so unsure of
their ground that they have taken different positions in different cases,
the courts should feel something less than the confidence in agency expertise that called forth the rule of limited review. In such a case, the
reviewing court may well declare that the agency's decisions hardly have
the "consistency to which [it] should yield [its] judgment." 133 Hence, as
the Court put it not long ago, "An agency interpretation of a relevant
provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency
view." 134
The most important issue resulting from the Rust application of
127. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987).
128. 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2202 (1971).
129. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1886 (2d

ed. 1951).
130. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991).
131. Id.
132. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
133. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1946) (Learned
Hand, J., writing the opinion of the Court), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
134. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987). See also NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S112, 124 (1987); Seldovia Native Assn. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d
1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990); Board of Trustees v. Sullivan, 763 F. Supp. 178, 184 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
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Chevron is whether it leaves to the agency questions of fundamental policy that in our representative system should be determined by the legislature. In Boreali v. Axelrod, 135 the New York court struck down
regulations prohibiting smoking in most public places on the ground
"that the... line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making has been transgressed." 136 It was for the legislature to decide
whether it was the policy of the state to prohibit smoking. "Striking the
proper balance among health concerns, cost and privacy interest... is a
uniquely legislative function.... Thus, to the extent that the agency has
built a regulatory scheme on its own conclusions about the appropriate
balance of trade-offs between health and cost to particular industries in
the private sector, it was 'acting solely on [its] own ideas of sound public
policy' and was therefore operating outside of its proper sphere of
authority."1'37

In Rust, the agency also imposed its own views on a basic question
of policy. It should be as much for the legislature to determine whether
abortion counseling should be prohibited as it is whether smoking should
be prohibited. In fact, the abortion-counseling-prohibition decision is
one that should more plainly be made by legislators, not unelected bureaucrats, because of its impact upon constitutional rights and upon women seeking such counseling. Statutory ambiguity should not be taken
as equivalent to delegation of lawmaking power where a question of fundamental policy is resolved. 3 ' In such a case, "[a]n agency cannot by its
regulations effect its vision of societal policy choices [prohibiting] that
which was never contemplated or delegated by the Legislature."' 39
V.

CONCLUSION

Administrative law is a magic mirror which reflects the principal
developments in the society which it helps to regulate."4 The crucial
administrative-law issues noted by Landis half a century ago were a direct result of the mushrooming administrative process during the NewDeal years. Critics of the agencies, particularly in the legal profession,
claimed that the new administrative justice was a revival of the prerogative justice of Stuart days and that agency procedure smacked of Star135. 71 N.Y.2d 1(1987).
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 105, at 143.
139. Campagna v. Shaffer, 73 N.Y. 2d 237, 242 (1989).
140. Cf.Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 25, 26 (1920).
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Chamber jurisprudence. Even as restrained a body as the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure noted deficiencies in
agency procedure in its 1941 report. 141 Three members of the committee
went further and condemned the "substantial defects in adjudicatory
practices"-particularly their "haphazard" and "formless" character. 142
The solution to the procedure problem was seen to be a legislative
code of standards of fair administrative procedure.14 3 Such a law was
strongly opposed by the agencies and many of their defenders. Hence,
the primary crucial issue of the day was whether agencies should be subjected to a general administrative-procedure law.
Those disturbed by the growth of administrative power were also
concerned about what they considered the ineffectiveness of judicial review. With the Attorney General's Committee minority, they believed
that Congress should prescribe the scope of review rather than leave it to
the courts to do so "without needed statutory direction."" A general
feeling that judicial review was too narrow led to Congressional passage
of the Walter-Logan bill, vetoed by President Roosevelt, which would
have substantially broadened the scope of review. Because of the conflicting views on scope of review, Landis noted the proper scope of review
as a second crucial issue.
The crucial issues stated by Landis were, as previously discussed,
resolved in the years following his lecture. As significant as the resolution of the these crucial issues was the change in the administrative-law
climate that occurred. The years following the Landis lecture were critical in the development of American administrative law. Such changes
included: (1) the publication of the report and studies of the Attorney
General's Committee, which for the first time provided a detailed factual
picture of the working of the federal administrative process; (2) the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, based upon the report of
the Attorney General's Committee, which was the first significant legislative intervention in the field of administrative law; and (3) the continuing
expansion in administrative authority, which led people on both sides of
the political boundary to realize the need for safeguards.
When Landis spoke, only those on the so-called "right" (accused by
their opponents of being concerned only with property rights and really
141.
(1941).
142.
143.
144.

Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure Chapters 4-5
Id. at 213.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 209.
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aiming their shafts at the substance, rather than the administrative machinery, of the New Deal legislation) articulated their demands for controls over agency authority. More recently, proposals for safeguards
have evoked a bipartisan response all but inconceivable fifty years ago.
As Justice Douglas, noted for anything but hostility toward the administrative process, asserted "[uless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modem
government, can become a monster which rules with no practical limits
on its discretion. Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty."' 45 A decade or two earlier, it would have
been almost unthinkable for one of Justice Douglas's political convictions
to direct such a "sanguinary simile" 14 6 against administrative expertness.
It is not that the views of those involved were swayed by shifts in the
political wind, but rather that developments in administrative law led to
the changing climate. Extremists on both sides moved toward the middle, and, consequently, most of the controversy engendered by extremism
tended to abate.
During the quarter century in question, another development occurred, pregnant with consequences for administrative law - the rise of
the Welfare State. By midcentury, the Welfare State was an established
fact in both the polity and the law. Administrative law was its primary
instrument. Administrative power expanded into areas of social welfare.
The trend, which began with the Social Security Act of 1935, intensified
over the years. Disability, welfare, aid to dependent children, health
care, and a growing list of other services (education, medical care, housing, slum clearance, urban development) all came under the fostering
guardianship of the administrative process. The traditional area of administrative regulation was dwarfed by the growing field of social
welfare.
The changing administrative-law focus, reflecting the burgeoning of
the Welfare State, gave rise to the primary crucial issue of the third quarter of the century. The new growing point of administrative law, socialwelfare administration, was subjected to the fundamentals of fair play
that had been developed to control more traditional regulatory administration. That issue was resolved in Goldberg v. Kelly,147 which held that
government largess were "entitlements" that were protected by due process. The administrative apparatus of the Welfare State was now as
145. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951).
146. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 33 (1936).
147. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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much subject to the requirements developed in our administrative law as
the older regulatory apparatus.
The years after Goldberg v. Kelly saw an end to the unlimited economic expansion that had fueled the growth of the Welfare State. In
what increasingly appeared as a postaflluent society, attention was paid
to the fear expressed in a Goldberg dissent "that new layers of procedural
protection may become an intolerable drain on the very funds earmarked
for food, clothing, and other living essentials."' 4 8 Extending the full panoply of due process to social-welfare would not only press these newer
areas into an inappropriate judicialized mold; it would also channel
scarce resources into procedure from the funds available to aid the poor.
The Supreme Court attempted to deal with this problem by the costbenefit approach in Mathews v. Eldridge.14 9 Unfortunately, the Court
did not stop with the Mathews test in its use of CBA. Instead, it has been
moving toward a general use of CBA to determine whether particular
procedural rights are applicable in agency proceedings. CBA as the criterion in administrative procedure cases may lead to a major dilution in
individual rights, because the CBA balance always tilts in favor of costs
where rights that cannot be measured in mere monetary terms are at
issue.
Application of CBA to administrative procedure gives increasing
weight to agency autonomy in fashioning its own procedures. A narrower scope of review, such as the Chevron doctrine which has come to
dominate judicial review during the past decade, also favors agency autonomy. The end result of both CBA and Chevron is a renewed deference toward agencies that bears comparison with the trend of half a
century ago.
The current trend coincides with the emergence of the New Right in
jurisprudence. 5 0 Its members have brought about a new tilt toward the
Executive in our administrative law. Under it, the lion's share in the
interpretation, as in the carrying out of laws, has come once again to rest
with administration, with the "hard look" approach to judicial review15
giving way to renewed deference toward the administrative expert. The
judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush have used their positions to begin to translate the New Right legal agenda into positive
148. 397 U.S. at 284.
149. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
150. See generally Kozinski, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY XI (Dorne and

Manne eds. 1987).
151. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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law. 152
We should remember, however, that administrative law, like the law
itself in the Cardozo aphorism, has its epochs of ebbs and flow.15 3 The
past decade has seen a flow toward deference and away from the distrust
of the expert that had previously prevailed in the courts. Yet, if this
paper has shown anything, it is that the administrative-law flow is never
constant in one direction. With a Democratic Administration in power,
the Reagan-Bush judges may be more reluctant to apply the deference
doctrine. The result may be a reversal in the tendency to defer unduly
and a new period of judicial skepticism toward the administrative expert.
The opposite scenario is also possible: An increase in regulatory activity accompanied by a new zealousness in applying Chevron to support
the activities of a reinvigorated Administrative State. At any rate, by
that time, the current crucial administrative law issues may have been
resolved, but we can be sure that new ones will have arisen to take their
place.
152. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK (1990) (developing the theme).
153. Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 126 (1921).
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